Chapter 12. Examining the Concept of the Soul. Part 2 - Abortions

The topic of abortion could arguably have been included in the chapter "The Fate of Children and Those with Mental Impairments." However, given the lack of consensus—both in society and even among some scientific circles—on whether potential personhood should be equated with actual personhood, it is appropriate to examine this issue within the context of the soul.

To begin, let us critique the position of theists, particularly Christian movements, who believe that God does not interfere with the arbitrariness of human will, allowing individuals to choose their own path and face the consequences. Shouldn't believers, by the same logic, allow everyone to decide their own fate? Of course, God, who has provided humanity with guidance on His will, does not teach indifference. However, there is a clear distinction between expressing an opinion and resorting to physical coercion—something that theists, at times, seem to overlook.

Turning to the supporters of "choice," particularly those who justify their position from an evolutionary perspective, their rhetoric against "killing a potential personality" appears inconsistent. Historically, society has rarely hesitated to eliminate those deemed dangerous or harmful. We even invented the electric chair for convenience. Whenever something disrupted societal well-being, we removed it. This terminological juggling rests entirely on how people interpret the phrases describing such actions.

It seems that if someone is perceived as lacking the intent to cause harm or inconvenience, eliminating such an entity feels unjust and unwarranted. To avoid emotional identification with the subject, terms like "life" or "potential personhood" are replaced with more technical language that does not alter the underlying reality. The phrase "cleansing the body of an embryo" elicits a similar emotional reaction, despite its clinical framing.

In practice, this emotional reaction is nearly universal. Even in the Age of Enlightenment, when processes were dissected into rational components, people continued to react viscerally to the concept of abortion despite intellectual understanding. This tension persists today. Even fervent "pro-choice" advocates often find themselves grappling with an instinctive unease, countering it by artificially stimulating contrasting emotions. Terms like "parasite," "cancer," or "invader" are deployed, sometimes alongside imagery reminiscent of the Alien franchise—where xenomorphs invade the human body, develop parasitically within, and emerge, killing their host.

Without such psychosomatic mechanisms to override empathy, it becomes nearly impossible to suppress the intuitive sense of compassion for the embryo.

How, then, did the condemnation of abortion become ingrained as part of our evolutionary arsenal of universal intuitive morality?

The answer lies in biology, particularly in the chemistry of attachment, and it is especially pronounced in women. The foetus generates a powerful hormonal environment, which leaves a profound physiological and emotional imprint. Oxytocin, the so-called "bonding hormone," plays a significant role in fostering attachment, a trait deeply embedded in our genome and passed down through generations.

When an abortion occurs, this intricate system is abruptly disrupted. Women frequently experience depression and guilt as the hormonal and psychological upheaval takes its toll. Unfortunately, modern abortion practices often neglect a comprehensive approach to patient care, which should include psychological support and rehabilitation.

At the moment of foetal death, a surge of stress hormones is released, which is mirrored in the mother's system. Even in patients who appear outwardly composed and possess strong stress resistance, the physiological and neurological strain can be significant.

The male reaction to abortions is typically more restrained, often framed as a matter of principle. However, evolutionary empathy has embedded in men an instinctive drive to protect women from pain and suffering. When a man observes signs of hormonal stress in a woman, his own hormones are triggered in response. Even if both partners are resolutely in favour of an abortion, neither can entirely escape the biological surge of emotions. This reaction layered over our innate genetic drive for reproduction—which inherently resists its interruption—has evolved into an intuitive morality. In this framework, the absence of internal resistance to abortion could even be seen as unnatural. This deeply rooted feeling is inscribed in our genetic code, making it unlikely that a purely intellectual "victory of enlightenment" will ever fully suppress it. To eradicate this intuitive feeling, one would have to dismantle the very instincts tied to reproduction and compassion as fundamental phenomena.

In debates on the morality of abortion, this evolutionary programming (or divine design, for theists) tilts the balance against the notion of "abortion at the snap of a finger." Like other moral values, this instinct has been shaped to preserve life and minimise suffering.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that suffering itself becomes the central criterion in this moral dilemma. A foetus may not perceive pain depending on its stage of development, but the woman is almost certainly subject to both physical and psychological suffering when carrying and giving birth to a child she does not want. Yet, this form of suffering is a relatively modern phenomenon in evolutionary terms. It has emerged alongside the culture of comfort and is not yet deeply embedded in our intuitive moral framework.

Naturally, one might object that humans are not merely animals bound by instinctive morality, as intelligence has granted us the ability to evaluate situations in ways that transcend genetic programming. And indeed, this is true! For that reason, the next stage of reasoning must move beyond intuitive morality to examine the social constructs of values that shape our modern moral landscape.

Objectively, we must seek ways to minimise the total sum of suffering—just as the rational concept of God considered in this book suggests.

Let us begin by acknowledging the hypothetical evolutionary potential for life in inorganic matter and, even more so, the potential for human life in cells containing chromosomes and genetic information. However, there is a broad consensus that the formation of human life begins only at the moment of fertilisation, so it is unnecessary to stretch the argument to extremes.

What we are observing is ultimately a process of "killing"—one that, at certain stages, is regulated naturally. This process includes the non-implantation of fertilised eggs as well as spontaneous abortions or miscarriages at various stages. While these events may be labelled as tragedies or accidents, they are often the result of the body's natural discrimination between viable and non-viable "lives." Factors such as the body's readiness for pregnancy play a critical role in determining whether implantation occurs or whether the foetus is spontaneously aborted.

Supporters of "pro-choice" might argue that this natural mechanism parallels the material or moral unreadiness of parents to raise a child. However, this comparison is not entirely honest. Radical theists—and in some cases, government organisations—frequently propose "buying out" the unborn child, offering financial support to the mother and ensuring the child's upbringing in the care of new parents eager for children. Let us not be disingenuous: there are "organisms" (or countries) capable of "carrying" any child.

The situation with non-viable children is fundamentally different. Their birth would almost inevitably increase suffering, regardless of whether they are placed with loving, affluent parents. Many severe pathologies are invariably fatal. However, if I understand the "pro-life" position correctly, few oppose abortions for medical reasons. When conditions are detected that would doom a child to a short life filled with physical pain and bring emotional suffering to the parents, pro-life advocates generally consider abortion acceptable. This includes cases where prioritising the mother's life over the unborn child is necessary.

I must admit, this was a sobering revelation for me. I had been under the impression left by ProChoice supporters' arguments that ProLife advocates were seeking to outlaw abortions entirely—both as a practice and a concept—campaigning to fine miscarriages and assign legal rights to fertilised eggs.

In reality, debates within the ProLife camp on this issue focus on what exactly qualifies as "a short life full of suffering." Only a few of them might claim this includes a 65-year lifespan capped by a Harvard degree and a lifetime spent in Camden, New Jersey. Most, however, agree that the phrase applies to severe pathologies that drastically limit life expectancy, typically to somewhere between six months and two years.

But what if the life expectancy is only five or fifteen years? Is it still worthwhile to experience even that brief portion of life if persistent pain is involved? This is a deeply challenging question.

I had the privilege of knowing a family who faced this very dilemma. Their daughter was born with a condition that carried a life expectancy of just three to twenty years. The parents chose to bring her into the world, guided by an unshakable conviction that she had a right to experience life, to feel their love, and to know their care.

Some might accuse them of selfishly fulfilling their own parental desires, even at the cost of her suffering. Yet, in witnessing the girl's life, I found myself questioning many assumptions about the delicate balance between pain and the profound awareness of simply being alive.

Despite her illness, she was a radiant soul—both beautiful and intellectually gifted. Her parents poured every ounce of their love and energy into her care, creating a life filled with moments of joy and meaning. By her own account, the pain never outweighed the happiness she felt.

She dreamed as we all do, even as she and her parents lived under the shadow of time slipping away. At the age of 19, while making plans for the next day, she quietly left this world.

She and her family faced her death with understanding, acceptance, and even gratitude. They cherished the years they had, knowing that her life—though brief—was filled with a rich tapestry of emotions, experiences, and meaning. In their grief, they mirrored those who bid farewell to loved ones who have lived a full, natural life.

The difference lies not in the length of life but in how we attune ourselves to the time we are given. A short life does not necessarily mean an inferior, unhappy, or failed one. The very act of self-awareness is worth experiencing—to feel, to smile, to cry, to grasp the fleeting beauty of existence.

We complain about pain and failure because we expect too much, losing sight of life's fundamental value. In truth, the experience of life itself is immeasurably more important than not experiencing pain.

Judging the worth of life for a child with such conditions and limited life expectancy (particularly one who can find care if the parents refuse) strikes me as deeply immoral. At least, this is the conclusion my intuitive morality leads me to, and I find no rational arguments to contradict it.

That said, we cannot assume that the existence of state or private organisations capable of guaranteeing care for a born child allows us to universalise the idea that any abortion not performed for medical reasons is merely an emotional whim, a pursuit of convenience, careerism, or superficial comfort.

There are countries where children, regardless of their health status, are born into poverty, further straining the economic and mental well-being of their families. In such circumstances, abortion can have at least some justified reasons. Yet here lies the paradox: the very availability of abortion rights may inadvertently increase the overall burden of suffering.

Firstly, the legality of abortion can make people less cautious, as it removes the fear of resorting to illegal, high-risk procedures. This, in turn, leads to more frequent unprotected or promiscuous relationships, both within families and outside them, increasing the prevalence of unwanted pregnancies. The outcome is a higher reliance on procedures or medications that are far from harmless.

Of course, pharmaceutical companies developing these medications often refute claims of harm. However, it's telling that those who insist these drugs are "perfectly safe" have never volunteered for controlled experiments involving their monthly use over a five-year period.

Even if these procedures were as seemingly harmless as taking a spoonful of sugar daily, the physical and emotional strain on the body cannot be dismissed. While it would be unethical to suggest that advocates undergo conception every three months to test the limits of this lifestyle, we must proceed with the assumption that concerns about its impact hold some validity.

Uncontrolled access to abortion can lead to an increase not only in the number of associated health issues, such as sexually transmitted diseases (fuelled by misplaced confidence in abortifacients) but also in pregnancies that progress to stages where abortion becomes medically inadvisable or contraindicated. Paradoxically, the legality of abortion might contribute to a rise in the number of unwanted children rather than reducing their prevalence.

For example, prior to the legalisation of abortion in Ireland in 2018, the country's birth rate stood at around 1.7 children per woman, below the European Union average. After legalisation, Ireland's birth rate began to rise, reaching 1.8 children per woman by 2021. Similarly, in Malta, where abortion remains completely banned, the birth rate is approximately 1.45 children per woman—lower than in neighbouring Italy and Spain, both of which have legal abortion access. Comparisons across Latin American countries yield similar patterns, further challenging the simplistic assumption that abortion access reduces births across the board.

It is also worth noting the fundamental differences in the biological mechanisms underlying sexual desire in men and women. Unlike men, who experience consistent reproductive potential, women face the possibility of motherhood after every sexual encounter. This evolutionary reality has historically embedded caution and deliberation in female partner choice, as well as the timing and context of sexual activity. Modernity, however, seeks to erode these genetic mechanisms through the dissemination of social narratives that frame such caution as outdated stereotypes restricting female autonomy.

Returning to the issue of abortion legality, one might argue that a heightened awareness of reproductive risks fosters a more prudent approach to intimate relationships. Such an approach would be marked by caution, deliberation, and (forgive the sacrilege) perhaps even less frequent sexual activity—a mindset that contrasts starkly with hypersexualised culture. Hypersexuality, far from liberating society, tends to undermine contributions to social, economic, and intellectual spheres. Instead, it promotes aggression, self-dissatisfaction, and a heightened prevalence of mental health issues within the population.

Historically, the natural barrier to unchecked primal instincts was the activation of responsibility instincts triggered by the inevitable emergence of offspring. This dynamic, disrupted by the invention of abortifacients and contraceptives, once helped regulate hypersexuality and facilitated the formation of families. The family unit, in turn, is uniquely capable of redirecting individual behaviour away from the pursuit of attention from the opposite sex and towards broader social goals.

At its core, the demand for unrestricted access to abortion is, indirectly, a demand for the freedom to engage in intimate relationships without consequence. Let's not pretend otherwise—this is hardly a secret. Whether we call it freedom or “promiscuity”, the result remains the same. After all, the more moderate pro-life agenda does not aim to eliminate abortion entirely; rather, it seeks to impose restrictions on procedures resulting from irresponsible sexual behaviour. Abortions in cases of rape, for instance, are generally allowed with minimal bureaucratic requirements, such as filing a criminal case, consulting a psychologist, and informing the mother of available options, including adoption or social support.

But, of course, intimacy is a personal right—arguably the ultimate expression of freedom. This, in essence, is the rallying cry of pro-choice advocates: that no one, especially those invoking theistic morality, has the right to curtail this freedom.

If there is any exception that might lend weight to restrictions on abortion, it lies in the emerging data on the susceptibility of the foetus to pain at various stages of intrauterine development. This is, arguably, the only rational argument capable of justifying a prohibition on abortions.

And yet, in a delightful twist, pro-choice supporters find themselves well-equipped with both the data and a broad base of like-minded advocates to reinforce their position. Studies, statistics, and research abound, all eagerly pointing to the irrelevance of pain thresholds until the later stages of pregnancy. (Of course, no one would ever interpret observational data to align with their own beliefs—perish the thought! Still, we can all agree, can't we, that the freedom to love without constraint is a rather compelling desire?)

Until recently, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (ACOG) and other medical organisations held a tentative consensus that foetal pain perception was unlikely before the third trimester. However, a significant paradigm shift has begun to emerge in the scientific community.

Professor Stuart Derbyshire, a British scientist and a prominent researcher in the psychology and neurobiology of pain, was long regarded as a leading proponent of the view that the foetus is incapable of feeling pain before the third trimester. His earlier work argued that pain perception could not occur before 24 weeks of pregnancy due to the underdevelopment of thalamocortical connections—neural pathways between the thalamus and the cerebral cortex essential for pain perception. Notably, Derbyshire remains a supporter of abortion rights, aligning this view with his earlier findings.

However, in 2020, Derbyshire, together with John Bockmann, published a groundbreaking article in the Journal of Medical Ethics that revised his stance. The authors posited that foetal pain perception might begin much earlier than previously thought, potentially as early as 12 weeks.

In this paper, Derbyshire and Bockmann re-evaluated new data on the development of the foetal nervous system. They highlighted evidence suggesting that reflexive and physiological responses to external stimuli might indicate the early formation of sensory pathways. Furthermore, the authors proposed that thalamocortical connections once believed to develop only after 24 weeks, could begin forming significantly earlier, potentially enabling the foetus to experience pain stimuli in earlier stages of pregnancy.

This publication ignited intense debate within the scientific community and the field of medical ethics. While some researchers advocated for further exploration of this new perspective's implications, others expressed scepticism, questioning whether the data robustly supports a shift in our understanding of early pain perception.

It was previously believed that for the emotional perception of pain to occur, fully developed connections between various regions of the brain—such as the midbrain and the cerebrum—are essential. While the embryo begins forming basic structures like the forebrain, midbrain, and hindbrain as early as four weeks of pregnancy, the foetus requires mature neural pathways connecting the midbrain to the cerebral cortex to perceive pain emotionally.

This does not imply literal "gaps" in the brain, as is sometimes simplistically presented to the public. Rather, these pathways are not yet densely developed. Due to this incomplete formation, it was thought that the observable reactions of the foetus during abortions—such as limb withdrawal during piercing or cutting procedures, facial grimaces, evasive movements, or mouth opening—are reflexive and unrelated to conscious pain perception. Similarly, endocrine and physiological responses, such as the release of stress hormones and changes in heart rate, were attributed to basic autonomic mechanisms developing in the first trimester—processes the foetus likely remains unaware of.

By the 24th week of pregnancy, it was assumed that the connections between the midbrain and the cerebral cortex become sufficiently mature, enabling the foetus to process more complex emotional responses to pain.

However, these long-standing assumptions were challenged by studies involving individuals with severe damage to brain regions traditionally associated with pain perception. These studies revealed that such individuals could still experience pain, undermining the idea that specific brain structures are strictly necessary for pain perception. This phenomenon is attributed to neuroplasticity—the brain's remarkable ability to restructure neural networks to preserve essential functions.

For instance, patients suffering from chronic pain after traumatic brain injury (TBI) often continue to feel pain, even when the associated brain regions are damaged, as the brain finds alternative pathways for processing pain signals. Similarly, individuals with cognitive motor dissociation (CMD)—who may appear unresponsive or insensitive—have been shown through neurological data to retain pain perception despite significant brain damage.

Despite these findings, the question of foetal pain remains unresolved. While such studies have shaken traditional views, they have not convinced everyone, as it remains impossible to conduct comparable research on embryos.

Even if we draw a parallel between the brain and nervous system functions in a foetus and those in a human, assuming that the foetus also possesses neuroplasticity—where unformed neural connections and brain regions are temporarily compensated by other areas of the brain or by nominal nociceptors in the skin or nerve fibres forming as early as 4–6 weeks—it remains unclear what this pain would feel like, the extent of its intensity, or whether the foetus (let alone the embryo) has the capacity for pain awareness at such an early stage. These uncertainties, grounded in logical considerations, continue to cast doubt within the scientific community on the validity of such analogies.

Nonetheless, an increasing number of clinics around the world have started employing anaesthesia and analgesia for foetuses during invasive procedures. These practices are primarily based on observations of behavioural, hormonal, and physiological responses in the foetus, which could indicate the perception of pain.

For a deeper understanding of this subject, you can familiarise yourself with several key studies and articles that conclude the following:

•       Embryological evidence: Early forms of nerve cells and networks emerge earlier in development than the mature forms of receptors and conductive pathways.

•       Central nervous system development: The central nervous system begins forming as early as the third week after conception. Basic neural structures may begin functioning during early development, potentially as early as 4–5 weeks.

•       Nociceptor formation: Although mature pain receptors (nociceptors) develop later, reliable data suggests that basic nociceptor structures begin forming in the skin as early as 5 weeks of pregnancy.

The Abortion Dilemma Through the Prism of a Rational Concept of God

Naturally, all these studies—whether supporting or opposing abortion—cannot be definitively proven or disproven. They are largely deductive in nature, built on known data about the unique properties of the human brain and speculative hypotheses about when these properties develop during foetal formation. Since the conclusions rely heavily on logical reasoning from limited data, we are similarly entitled to construct a perspective within our religious framework to address this moral dilemma.

According to the principle of the three pillars for determining the truth of any abstract idea—intuition, logic, and empirical evidence—we already find alignment with general moral intuition regarding the value of life. However, we lack definitive empirical data confirming that the reflexes, facial expressions, heartbeat, and hormonal responses of the foetus constitute conscious pain. As a result, logic, in the absence of accurate empirical data, cannot produce an unequivocal conclusion. It must rely instead on hypotheses, one of which is our concept of a rational God—a concept we've rooted in the framework of existing Christian traditions.

While it is evident that the Bible does not directly address practices born of modern comforts, it consistently emphasises the value of life through fundamental principles and imagery. Beyond enshrining the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" in the Decalogue—a reflection of God's character and ultimate plan for creation—God further demonstrated the value of human life through the incarnate image of redemption.

Of course, that said, these references may pertain specifically to fully formed life rather than the stages of its formation. This interpretation is entirely plausible, except for one crucial detail often overlooked in discussions about the definition of life in the Bible: the prohibition on bloodshed and the assertion that life resides in the blood.

As stated in Leviticus 17:14.: "For it is the life of all flesh; the blood of it is for the life thereof: therefore I said unto the children of Israel, Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh: for the life of all flesh is the blood thereof: whosoever eateth it shall be cut off."

Obviously, the original prohibition on shedding the blood of any creature in relation to animals was changed to a symbolic reference to the original reason for God's aversion to death and pain caused by the process of destroying life. (For now, I will avoid delving into the details of this prohibition, as these will be explored in the chapter on veganism.) At this point, it suffices to suggest that the prohibition served to remind people that the bloodshed involved in the consumption of animals was not a divinely accepted norm but a tragic concession to humanity's current state—one for which God assumes responsibility. The allowance for the death of humans and animals was, therefore, permissive in nature, intended to minimise the overall scale of suffering or, at the very least, to maintain it at a lower level.

Blood, as a marker of life and suffering, appears to have been deliberately chosen by God as a clear and comprehensible indicator for humans. The symbolism of blood underscores the gravity of taking life, whether human or animal and serves as a reminder of the consequences of such acts—a state of suffering that God does not desire but permits to avert even greater harm.

The term "shedding" seems deliberately chosen to differentiate visible blood loss from less obvious forms of killing, such as crushing an insect. This distinction explains why insects are excluded from biblical laws on blood: their rudimentary nervous systems likely experience minimal pain, rendering their deaths less morally significant in this context.

Additionally, the prohibition focuses on the outflow of blood, ensuring that minor injuries or small blood loss are not equated with the taking of life. Symbolically, bloodshed represented not only the loss of life but also the suffering inherent in such an act, as it was associated with the cessation of breathing and the end of existence.

However, this emphasis on bloodshed does not exempt other forms of killing, such as poisoning or strangulation, from moral condemnation. While bloodshed provided a clear, visible marker, the underlying principle remained consistent: the deliberate taking of life was always considered a profound act, regardless of whether blood was visibly involved.

Let us consider the process of abortion in the context of God's definition of the soul and suffering:

The circulatory system in the embryo begins to form remarkably early. By the 17th to 18th day after conception, primary blood vessels and the first blood cells begin to develop. By the 21st day, the heart starts beating, initiating blood circulation throughout the embryo. Concurrently, the nervous system also begins to develop. Around the 17th to 18th day of human embryogenesis, the neural plate forms from the ectoderm, folding into the neural tube—a precursor to the brain and spinal cord. By the 28th day, the neural tube is fully closed, enabling basic signalling functions.

Even if we assume that abortions performed before the formation of the circulatory system—roughly before the 3rd or 4th week—might be considered humane, we encounter a significant issue: the pregnancy often remains asymptomatic during this phase. Many women do not notice changes in their bodies until 8–10 weeks, well beyond this hypothetical "humane" threshold.

As a result, the widespread availability of abortifacients risks causing the painful death of an entity that, by biblical criteria, may already qualify as a "living soul." Within the framework of a rational God, the term "living soul" must encompass a being capable of experiencing pain and suffering, even at its earliest stages of development.

By the 5th week, the embryo already takes on a distinct humanoid appearance. By 5–6 weeks, many women begin to experience physical symptoms of pregnancy, including nausea (morning sickness), fatigue, frequent urination, and breast enlargement—clear indications of the embryo's rapid development.

At this stage, it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore the emotional dimension of this discussion.

If humans can empathise with the reflex convulsions of an earthworm crushed underfoot or the silent agony of a slug dissolving in salt, it is no surprise that our compassion deepens as the subject grows more recognisably human. A photograph by Graham Lavery from Vietnam vividly illustrates this truth. The image, which sparked a global outpouring of emotion and inspired international aid projects, shows a frail, sickly kitten reaching out to embrace a man's foot, resting its head against it in apparent exhaustion. Likely, the kitten sought warmth rather than expressing emotion, yet even recalling this scene stirs visceral reactions, as if the brain itself were experiencing the pain.

Now, imagine this same empathy applied to an embryo. By the fifth week, it already exhibits recognisably human features—tiny arms and legs, dark spots where the eyes will form, and a nervous system nearly as complex as that of the kitten in the photograph. The knowledge of this development can evoke an even more profound sense of connection and protectiveness, rooted in the same biological instincts that compel us to value life and abhor suffering.

This innate empathy explains why many individuals file lawsuits against protesters who display graphic images of aborted foetuses outside clinics. Beyond the hormonal and emotional stress patients experience, there is a universal sense of shared identity that triggers near-physical pain and lasting emotional trauma. It also explains why we often distort or obscure depictions of foetuses in public discussions about abortion. We are not fighting against radical ideologies alone; we are, in fact, waging a battle against our nature—our own genetic programming—a deep, primal drive to fight for life and resist death.

Given this, a logical and cautious approach becomes not only reasonable but necessary. Biblical texts, when analysed logically and even reason itself, suggest prudence in the face of uncertainty. Where precise data on foetal experiences is lacking, the judicial principle of erring on the side of acquittal rather than condemnation applies. In this context, "acquittal" means prioritising the potential for life and minimising the risk of unnecessary suffering.

A potential compromise might involve limiting abortion procedures to medical centres and restricting them to the period before the rudimentary nervous system begins to form—around the 4th week of gestation. However, such a law would differ little from an outright ban, as it would significantly increase the sense of responsibility involved. For many, it would likely be perceived as almost as radical as current restrictions on elective termination after 20 weeks, when the foetus can already respond to touch through the mother's abdomen.

Let's be honest: from a purely logical standpoint, the prohibition against killing a premature baby—flushed down the toilet along with the placenta—seems to contradict laws permitting abortions on demand. It's not inconceivable that this form of abortion will soon be normalised, framed as no different from the natural right to use the toilet when necessary. After all, a child left to perish in a sewer pipe remains in the same dark and cramped environment as before birth (or, as it might euphemistically be called, a "body cleansing"). The child would die at roughly the same pace as from abortifacients—arguably even more humanely than during dismemberment.

The only noticeable difference would be the child's ability to breathe air, producing cries that might disturb neighbours—those neighbours whose moral intuitions and "prejudices" clash uncomfortably with the progressive legislation of a "scientifically enlightened" society. We will, no doubt, be reassured by popular science communicators that the neural connections in such a pseudo-living foetus are insufficient to comprehend the horror of its circumstances. They will explain that we are merely "misidentifying" this scenario by projecting our own unfounded emotional associations onto what they'll insist is not yet truly "life."

Summary of the Abortion Section

1.     The Intuitive Aversion to Abortion:

The negative reaction to abortion is deeply intuitive. The inherent value of life and the instinct to preserve offspring are likely rooted in the evolutionary programming of our species' genome.

2.     Misrepresentation of Opposing Views:

Pro-choice advocates often frame their arguments against the extreme minority who call for a total ban on abortion under any circumstances. This creates a mirror contrast to the pro-choice position, portraying it as moderate by comparison. In reality, the majority of abortion opponents advocate for regulating the procedure in coordination with medical experts, psychologists, and child welfare authorities. This regulation is typically limited to cases where the physical or mental health of the mother faces substantial and unavoidable harm. Furthermore, these opponents often propose financial and social support for women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term, ensuring the child's well-being through adoption or other means if necessary.

3.     Abortion Legislation and Demographic Trends:

Statistical evidence suggests that countries with strict abortion bans often experience lower birth rates compared to those where abortion is legal. For example, Poland, which banned abortion in the early 1990s, saw its birth rate decline rather than increase. Currently, Poland's birth rate is approximately half that of many European countries where abortion is permitted. Pro-choice advocates attribute this trend to increased caution among women in countries with abortion restrictions, who take greater measures to avoid unplanned pregnancies. However, while the legalisation of unrestricted abortions may influence birth rates, it is not necessarily a demographic advantage. Such trends often result in an increase in children requiring adoption, frequently to other countries. Moreover, there are far more effective ways to stimulate birth rates than through heightened suffering, societal fragmentation and depression.

4.     The Right to Freedom vs. Responsibility:

At the heart of the argument for abortion rights lies the fundamental right to engage in intimate relationships freely, often divorced from the responsibility of potential consequences. This freedom risks undermining the seriousness of interpersonal relationships and limiting the natural flow of physiological pleasures. While the pursuit of physical pleasure is undoubtedly an evolutionary instinct, in the animal world, this instinct is balanced by periods of responsibility driven by the care required for inevitable offspring.

Opponents of unrestricted abortions propose solutions that maintain this evolutionary instinct while introducing responsibility, thus supporting both physical and mental health for humanity. Examples of the positive impact of responsibility on moderating basic instincts include:

•       Refocusing energy on education, careers, and hobbies.

•       Strengthening families and promoting healthier demographic growth.

•       Reducing rates of STIs, depression, mental illness, and suicides.

•       Lowering dependence on dopamine-driven addictions, such as alcohol, smoking, drugs, gambling, and compulsive gaming.

5.     Weak or Insufficiently Supported Pro-Choice Arguments:

Several arguments advanced by pro-choice advocates lack sufficient evidence or logical consistency:

•       Foetal vs. Human Distinction: The claim that a foetus is not self-aware and, therefore, not a person is flawed. A newborn is also not self-aware; the difference lies only in the additional synaptic connections formed post-birth due to sensory input from organs like the eyes, nose, and taste receptors. However, hearing, touch, and light sensitivity develop extensively in the womb, forming a significant portion of these connections before birth. If self-awareness hinges on the number of activated synapses, the difference between a born and unborn child becomes negligible.

•       Dependence on the Mother: The argument that a foetus lacks autonomy because it depends on the mother's body applies equally to a born child, who relies on the mother's physical and material resources for years. Pregnancy-related resource expenditure can often be restored or managed with proper care.

•       Lack of Pain Awareness: Assertions that a foetus or embryo cannot feel pain remain unprovable due to the inherent limitations of available data and the inability to conduct fully deductive analyses. Even if one accepts the argument that a “not fully developed” brain lacks the capacity for self-awareness or consciousness, observable pain reactions characteristic of humans provide sufficient grounds for concern. The mere fact that humans intuitively identify with such signs of suffering is a sufficient argument for reconsidering this practice.

Ultimately, laws surrounding abortion should aim to minimise societal stress rather than solely addressing individual preferences. The moral burden of desensitising society to suffering risks eroding collective compassion and empathy, potentially undermining the shared values and ethical foundations that uphold civilisation.

6.     Religious and Civic Engagement:

Religious communities, particularly Christians, cannot contradict the example of God, who granted humans free will—a freedom that does not extend to aggressive or provocative behaviour. However, based on this same principle, believers have the right to express their civic stance and engage in public discourse, supporting or opposing relevant legislation.

7.     Biblical Perspective on the Soul and Life:

According to biblical texts, the origin of the soul coincides with the parallel development of the circulatory and nervous systems. This alignment suggests the emergence of a functioning psycho-emotional complex capable of experiencing pain, even if not fully conscious. Furthermore, the foetus is recognised as inherently possessing personhood, with its developing cognitive and emotional structures serving as evidence of its individuality and capacity for self-awareness.